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Abstract 
 
This research examines whether rival firms’ market presence influences initial market 
entry decisions for U.S. fast food firms McDonald’s, KFC and Pizza Hut in Eastern China 
between 2004 and 2011. It also examines factors influencing the recent increase in local Chinese 
fast food firms’ initial market entry. The analysis utilizes a firm-and-consumer-learning 
theoretical model from Toivanen and Waterson (2005) and a single-spell discrete time hazard 
empirical model, which are applied to data from the Carolina Population Center’s China Health 
and Nutrition Survey. This research reveals that the presence of KFC in a given market did not 
influence McDonald’s initial market entry decisions during 2004 and 2011 (and vice versa). A 
positive relationship was demonstrated between KFC initial market entry and higher-population, 
higher-income markets, and the same was demonstrated for McDonald’s initial market entry and 
urban markets. Also, local Chinese fast food firms entered markets where KFC already existed. 
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I. Introduction 
  
 According to McDonald’s Corporation founder Ray Kroc in his autobiography Grinding 
It Out: The Making of McDonald’s, Kroc’s most important job as CEO was to choose promising 
new locations for McDonald’s franchises. Doing so required Kroc to analyze a myriad of factors 
such as community size, fast food competition, and proximity to extant McDonald’s stores. Kroc 
even mentions rummaging through competitors’ trash to gauge their sales volume! Although 
McDonald’s Corporation’s method for choosing new franchise locations has certainly grown 
more sophisticated since Kroc’s reign in the 1950s to 1970s, fast food firms’ choice of market 
entry in relation to profit potential and rivals’ presence remains vital (Kroc 1978). 
 While McDonald’s and fast food competitors like KFC have by now saturated the United 
States market, Asian markets (China in particular) remain a promising growth story. Since 
KFC’s debut with a Tiananmen Square store in 1987 Beijing, today there are over 4,600 KFCs in 
China, making KFC the leading foreign fast food brand (Yum! Brands 2014). KFC’s parent 
company, Yum! Brands, also operates 1,200 Pizza Huts in China. Besides KFC, China’s only 
other prominent Western fast food player is McDonald’s, which entered in 1992 (ICMR 2014). 
The competitive dynamic that saw McDonald’s as the United States’ fast food market “leader” 
and KFC as “follower” during late twentieth century America is reversed in China, seeing KFC 
as the market leader and more popular amongst Chinese consumers than McDonald’s. 
 As Yum! Brands and McDonald’s battle amongst each other for market share, of critical 
importance will be each firm’s process for choosing which Chinese markets to enter. Whichever 
firm can enter the most profitable markets the fastest has a competitive advantage. Thus both 
firms’ initial market entry decisions as a function of those markets’ estimated profitability 
(gleaned from present market structure) is of great interest. Also of interest is whether KFC and 
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Pizza Hut, both of which are owned by Yum! Brands, share amongst themselves common initial 
market entry processes or profitability forecasts to advance Yum! Brands’ growth. 
 In the past several years, a new phenomenon has emerged to complicate U.S. fast food 
firms’ expansion plans in China: local Chinese fast food firms are emerging en masse. The Wall 
Street Journal noted in December 2014 that these local firms are popping up in more rural 
markets and catering to localized tastes that U.S. fast food firms presently miss. Thus the factors 
determining initial market entry for this new wave of less-experienced, lower-budget local 
Chinese fast food firms are also of interest in this research (Abkowitz and Burkitt 2014). 
 While previous research has applied market-learning industrial organization theory to 
empirical analysis of fast food firm entry decisions in relation to market structure, and one study 
has even examined such decisions for KFC and McDonald’s in China, no research to date has 
examined initial Chinese market entry strategies amongst KFC, McDonald’s, Pizza Hut and 
local Chinese fast food firms (Shen and Xiao 2013). I analyze what market structure factors—
such as the presence of rival fast food firms and demographic characteristics like population 
density, mean wages, and urbanization—impact fast food firms’ initial entry decisions for 
Chinese markets from 2004-2011. My study builds upon existing literature by analyzing an 
expanded selection of fast food firms over the most recent time period of any similar research, 
and serves as the first research of its kind on China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data. 
 The paper will proceed as follows: first an examination of the motivation and importance 
of this research; then a literature review of relevant previous theoretical and empirical research, 
with attention to industrial organization and firm entry decisions; then the guiding firm-and-
consumer-learning theoretical model will be explained; then an explanation of the single-spell 
discrete time hazard empirical model used for this research; an overview of the CHNS data this 
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research utilizes; and finally, an analysis of the empirical results attained with a conclusion 
examining the implications of this research and suggesting areas for further related research. 
II. Motivation 
 
 This research is motivated by the desire to contribute to understanding of industrial 
organization and firm market entry behavior within China. Such motivation arises due to the 
importance of initial market entry—both for firms wishing to expand and profit in a fast-growing 
Chinese economy with increasingly sophisticated consumers and heightened competition, as well 
as for the interesting implications that this study’s differentiating aspects may contribute to 
existing literature. This research analyzes McDonald’s and KFC’s Chinese market entry over a 
more recent time period (2004-2011) than any comparable study. This research also examines 
the initial market entry strategies that fledgling local Chinese fast food firms are utilizing while 
attempting to grow and compete with their corporate American rivals in a profitable manner. 
III. Literature Review 
 
 Theory Literature 
 
 The relevant theory for this research encompasses industrial organization market-entry 
theory. Specifically, relevant previous research examines the ways in which market structure 
(which denotes the presence of own and rival firms operating in a given market, as well as 
consumer demographic characteristics of a given market) impacts firm entry decisions. 
 Economic theory on how market structure affects firm entry traces back to Bain (1951), 
who theorized a “one-way” causation chain between market concentration and competition. 
Shaked and Sutton (1990) laid further groundwork for traditional industrial organization theory. 
By acknowledging the difficulty of generating reliable entry models given multiple potential 
equilibria, then proposing a reparameterization of the status quo models to focus on empirically 
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observable market traits—namely the expansion effect and the competition effect with regards to 
firm expansion—Shaked and Sutton formulated testable estimates about the relationship between 
market concentration and competition. 
 While certainly a breakthrough, Shaked and Sutton’s theoretical model left much to be 
desired in its ability to explain certain observed market structures, such as a market where there 
is observed a positive effect of rival firms’ presence on another firm’s entry. Since it’s assumed 
that a firm will only enter a market if expected profits equal or exceed zero, one cannot explain 
firm over-saturation in certain markets and total absence of firm presence in other similar 
markets. In an economy where firms have perfect information and consumer demand is 
exogenous, there’s no reason why one firm would enter a saturated rather than under-served 
market.  
 Thus advances were made in industrial learning theory to better explain firm entry as a 
result of market structure. Caplin and Leahy (1998) observed that in reality, firms lack perfect 
information and face significant uncertainty about the profitability of a potential market. These 
firms can inform and improve their estimations of a market’s profitability by observing the 
present performance of rival firms (just as Ray Croc did by rummaging through competitors’ 
trash in the 1950s). This “firm-learning” model predicts that rival presence can positively affect 
own-firm entry. Baum, Li, and Usher (2000) took the firm-learning model a step further by 
differentiating between experiential and vicarious learning. Vicarious learning was described 
previously as learning through rival firms’ performance; whereas experiential learning involves a 
firm learning through its own stores’ performance and imitating successful stores’ entry models. 
 Yet these learning theories still do not explain why there has been observed in reality a 
positive relationship between the market presence of a firm’s own stores and that firm’s 
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subsequent additional market entry. Assuming exogenous consumer demand, would not opening 
further stores in a given market cannibalize the expanding firm’s profits? Toivanen and 
Waterson (2005) discuss a “consumer-learning” theory where the market presence of a firm such 
as McDonald’s causes consumer habit formation that over time increases demand for the firm’s 
goods. This consumer learning explains a positive effect between own-firm presence and entry. 
 One further theory proposed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) may explain why certain 
viably profitable markets remain devoid of any firms while other markets are cluttered with 
competing firms. Their theory of entry thresholds implies that a certain market size is needed to 
support n firms at average entry costs. Entry thresholds prove to be relatively small and once the 
entry threshold is reached, additional entrants don’t significantly impact competition. In other 
words, firms’ competitive conduct changes noticeably as the second or third firm enters a given 
market, but once five firms are reached, the next entrant has little effect on competitive conduct. 
Thus firms may prefer entering concentrated markets than building demand in untapped markets 
(because rival firms in a saturated market may have grown demand through consumer learning). 
 In addition to explaining market entry as a function of market structure, theory also 
wrestles with explaining the firm entry game itself. Dixit (1979) began the theoretical grappling 
match by using game theory to analyze market entry prevention and accommodation. Berry’s 
(1992) breakthrough treated the entry of existing firms as different to that of new firms, and 
expounded a theoretical model where leader and follower firms make sequential entry decisions. 
The follower takes the leader’s decision as given and observes the actual number of rival outlets 
in a given period, while the leader accounts for the rival’s optimal response when making its 
entry decisions. Thus the market entry game is based on firms accounting for the total number of 
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entrants, which Berry’s theory demonstrates is a uniquely determined outcome. Chevalier (1995) 
and Morton (1999) also treat entry of existing firms as different from new firms’ entry. 
Empirical Literature 
 The empirical modeling of strategic firm entry decisions as a result of market structure 
has proven difficult—partly because the equilibrium response of rival firms matters, which 
implies a simultaneous-move entry decision that cannot be modeled econometrically; and partly 
because there exist multiple potential equilibrium outcomes for a multi-firm market-entry game.  
Shaked and Sutton (1990) summarized such difficulty: “outcomes depend on models that 
are hard to identify or proxy empirically, so models may seem empirically empty in regard to 
predictions about industrial structure.” Shaked and Sutton thus concentrated on observable 
variables that could serve as proxies for unobserved variables. This involved assuming a multi-
good case with a sequential model of firm entry decisions. Berry (1992) refined Shaked and 
Sutton’s approach with an empirical methodology that used firm entry decisions as indicators of 
the underlying profitability functions guiding market structure. Examining firm-specific profit 
sources in the vast heterogeneous airline industry, Berry concluded that airport location chiefly 
determines airline profitability and competition. 
Toivanen and Waterson (2005) built upon Berry’s approach with a static model implying 
a two-stage entry game conditional on the actual order of play. In this model, leader and follower 
firms make sequential entry moves, which are observed annually. By utilizing the observed 
timing of entry, Toivanen and Waterson resolved the need to address firms’ decision 
interdependencies and solved for the decision problem of the second entrant. Toivanen and 
Waterson’s results empirically supported the theoretical model of “leader” and “follower" firm 
entry decisions.  
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Then there is the empirical question of accounting for firm heterogeneity and product 
differentiation. During empirical analysis, the effects of firm learning are not to be mistaken for 
demand heterogeneity, in which market-specific unobservables lead to greater or lesser demand 
than predicted. However, demand heterogeneity can be controlled for econometrically, as 
Toivanen and Waterson (2005) do in their research. Firm and product heterogeneity are taken 
into account by the empirical models of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) as well as Berry (1992). 
This is achieved by modeling firms’ expected profits based on revealed market entry decisions. 
These authors provide models that allow firms operating in an oligopoly to vary in entry costs, 
profit functions, and product offerings, which paves the way for interesting empirical analyses. 
IV. Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical model for this research is based on Toivanen and Waterson’s (2005) 
model. The economic agents are firms whose objective function is to maximize profits. With the 
decision whether to enter a given market (i.e. open a store) as the dependent variable, the key 
explanatory factor is the existing market structure where entry is being considered. 
 There are several assumptions underlying firms’ entry decisions. One is that firms will 
enter a given market so long as expected profits equal or exceed zero, as shown below. 
E(∏ij) – Fij ≥ 0 
Where E is expected profits for firm i’s entry ∏ into market j given fixed costs F.  
Also assumed is that firms have perfect information about their own fixed and variable 
cost structures, but have imperfect information about a given market’s profitability when 
considering entry. Thus firms form and update their assumptions about a market’s profitability 
by observing the performance of existing own-stores and rival firms, as well as market 
10  
Glenn Lippig-Singewald  March 4, 2015 
demographics like mean wages and urbanization. The equation below models a given firm’s 
initial market entry decision as a function of profit expectations formed by market structure.  
∏ijt = πijt(Rivaljt, Marketjt) – Fijt – ɛijt > 0 
Where the left-hand initial entry decision Π is modeled as a function of expected profits, based 
on rival firm presence (Rival) and market demographics (Market), for firm i in market j during 
time period t, accounting for firm i’s fixed costs F and error term ε. 
 The above theoretical foundation is implied by market-learning theory, which guides 
Toivanen and Waterson’s (2005) research as well as my own. Market learning implies a positive 
relationship between a firm’s market entry decision and the presence of rival firms in that market 
(through the positive spillover effect of vicarious firm learning), as well as a positive relationship 
between the market presence of a firm’s own stores and subsequent additional same-market store 
entry by that firm (through the induced market expansion resulting from consumer learning). 
 Toivanen and Waterson’s theory specifically applies to firms in a market duopoly. Thus a 
leader-follower model is assumed where the follower firm accounts for the leader’s observed 
entry in its entry decisions, and the leader accounts for the follower’s equilibrium response in its 
own entry decisions. Entry decisions are also assumed to be made on the basis of existing market 
conditions and do not account for expected future market profits. Of course, the assumption 
could be made that firms’ profit functions as revealed through prior market entry decisions also 
account for future-discounted expected market profits. 
 The main implications of the firm-and-consumer-learning theoretical model utilized by 
this research are to expect a positive relationship between own-firm and rival-firm presence on a 
given firm’s decision to enter a market. This would imply that firms are more likely to enter 
markets in which that firm or rival firms already operate than a market in which neither firm 
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currently operates. Also, the incorporation of market structure demographics into firms’ initial 
market entry decision functions suggests a positive relationship between profitability-indicating 
market demographics (e.g. mean wages, population density) and a firm’s initial market entry.  
 In the next section, we translate this theory into a testable empirical model. 
V. Empirical Model 
 
 The persistent difficulties in applying theoretical market entry models to empirical 
analysis include a dearth of revealed data to econometricians (e.g. a firm’s cost structure) and 
simplifying assumptions about firms’ homogeneity and access to perfect information (Berry and 
Reiss 2014). 
Thus Toivanen and Waterson decided to treat firms’ entry decisions as revealed 
preferences indicating underlying determinants of firm profitability (e.g. fixed and variable 
costs). In this case, the number of firms within a given market is treated as an endogenous 
variable. Another potential issue with analyzing market entry is multiplicity, since multiple 
firms’ entry functions must be considered using the same data. Toivanen and Waterson utilize 
the actual timing of firm entry to resolve the need to deal with interdependencies between the 
firms’ decisions, thus simplifying the model to deal with individual choices (Levin 2009). 
The empirical model for this research assumes that a firm enters a given market when its 
expected profits equal or exceed zero, where that firm’s expected profits are a function of market 
structure (demographics and the presence of own and rival firms) and the firm’s cost structure. 
Since the firm must plan its initial market entries in advance, the empirical model assumes that a 
firm’s initial market entry is a function of market structure in the previous observed time period. 
Thus the variables comprising market structure will be included as lags in the analysis. 
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This research utilizes a single-spell discrete time hazard model to analyze probability of 
firm entry. The time hazard model measures the conditional probability that a firm will enter a 
given market in a given year for the first time (a single-spell occurrence) given that it has not yet 
done so. The discrete time hazard will be modeled with a log-odds (or logit)-based logit-hazard 
model so that there will not be bounds above 1 and below 0. The discrete time hazard model 
works well because a firm’s initial market entry is a one-time event, and since firm entry is only 
observed at discrete surveyed time points. Another advantage of the time hazard model is the 
inclusion of the time-invariant community error term, which controls against biased estimations 
(since there is assumed zero mean error, the inclusion of this error term prevents biased results). 
The data contains both left-censored and right-censored firm entry observations. This 
means that for certain firms’ entry within certain city markets, a number of firms had already 
entered some markets prior to the research start date of 2004 (AKA left-censored), while other 
firms never entered a given market during 2004 to 2011 (AKA right-censored). Left-censored 
observations are treated as missing and are not analyzed within the model to avoid biased results. 
Below is the discrete time hazard model for a fast food firm’s initial market entry (three 
distinct versions of this analysis are done, one each for McDonald’s, KFC, and Chinese firms): 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0� =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  
Where Y is a firm i’s initial entry into market j during time t, R is a vector of rival fast food firm 
presence in market during time t-1, M is a vector of demographic variables for market j during 
time t-1, and µ is a time-invariant community error term with assumed mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2. 
 This research includes single-spell discrete time hazard analyses for KFC, McDonald’s, 
and other Chinese fast food firms’ initial market entry. The market-entry decisions for each firm 
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will be represented as a function of the presence of rival firms in a given market (R); and of 
market-specific demographics (M) which includes mean wages, population density, urbanization, 
total number of fast food restaurants, and whether population is over 1 million. Together, the 
vectors R and M constitute a given market’s structure (demographics and rival presence). 
 The inclusion of these variables stems from the theoretical and empirical models 
implemented by Toivanen and Waterson (2005) as adapted to this research, where market 
structure denotes the presence of own and rival firms as well as market demographics. The 
results attained from the discrete time hazard empirical model are discussed in Section VII. 
VI. Data Source 
 
 This research utilizes a dataset from the Carolina Population Center’s China Health & 
Nutrition Survey. The panel data set surveys several thousand randomly selected individuals 
within 216 sampling units across 9 eastern China provinces every 2-4 years between 1989 and 
2011. A map of the participating Chinese provinces can be observed below in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: CHNS Participating Provinces 
 
Map of provinces participating in the CHNS study, 1989-2011 (CPC) 
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The CHNS provides individual, household, and community-level information about 
demographics (e.g. income, population) and infrastructure (e.g. fast food chains’ market 
presence) relating to health and nutrition. The CHNS variables relevant to this research are 
aggregated at the community level for 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. Listed below in Table 1A 
and Table 1B are baseline summary statistics for the relevant variables sorted by year. A more 
detailed overall summary of these variables can be observed in Table 2 (Section IX).  
Table 1A         
Description of Market-Structure Variables by Year               
 2004 2006 2009 2011 
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Mean Wages (log) 8.687 (0.628) 9.007 (0.587) 9.608 (0.475) 9.898 (0.528) 
N of Fast Food Restaurants 0.453 (1.875) 0.519 (2.632) 0.258 (1.543) 0.756 (5.576) 
Province 37.333 (9.695) 37.284 (9.721) 37.359 (9.680) 36.045 (12.508) 
Urban (binary) 0.333 (0.472) 0.335 (0.473) 0.332 (0.472) 0.397 (0.490) 
City Population Over 1 Million (binary) 0.418 (0.494) 0.445 (0.498) 0.470 (0.500) 0.465 (0.500) 
City Population Density 1849.235 (8486.994) 972.922 (4639.924) 1835.255 (5121.620) 4779.672 (12769.490) 
City Exist McDonald's (binary) 0.097 (0.297) 0.128 (0.335) 0.175 (0.381) 0.233 (0.424) 
City Exist KFC (binary) 0.120 (0.326) 0.183 (0.388) 0.230 (0.422) 0.328 (0.470) 
City Exist Pizza Hut (binary) 0.042 (0.200) 0.064 (0.246) 0.074 (0.262) 0.164 (0.371) 
City Exist Other Chinese (binary) 0.056 (0.230) 0.041 (0.199) 0.143 (0.351) 0.178 (0.383) 
         
Table 1B         
Description of Market-Entry Variables by Year               
 2004 2006 2009 2011 
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
City Entry Any (binary) 0.000 (0.000) 0.166 (0.373) 0.213 (0.411) 0.156 (0.364) 
City Entry KFC (binary) 0.000 (0.000) 0.073 (0.261) 0.067 (0.251) 0.049 (0.217) 
City Entry McDonald's (binary) 0.000 (0.000) 0.040 (0.197) 0.058 (0.234) 0.022 (0.148) 
City Entry Other Chinese (binary) 0.000 (0.000) 0.061 (0.239) 0.126 (0.333) 0.067 (0.250) 
City Entry Pizza Hut (binary) 0.000 (0.000) 0.024 (0.153) 0.015 (0.121) 0.024 (0.155) 
City Entry YUM (binary) 0.000 (0.000) 0.127 (0.334) 0.121 (0.327) 0.094 (0.292) 
Number of Observations 1166   1216   1152   1319   
         
Note: There are no initial firm entry observations for 2004 because it cannot be assumed that restaurants which existed in 2004 entered in that year. The 
discrete time hazard model requires such left-censored observations to be eliminated from analysis. 
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 The strengths of the CHNS data include its reliability and consistent methodology. There 
are many pertinent market-structure variables that exist in the dataset, making the CHNS so 
comprehensive that no other data sources were needed for the key variables of interest. The 
CHNS data provides the most recent time frame for analysis of any previous similar research. 
Moreover, the data includes unprecedented data on Pizza Hut and Chinese fast food firms.  
 Setting aside these prevailing strengths, the drawbacks of the CHNS are its limited 
geographic scope (only select communities in Eastern China) and non-comprehensive tallying of 
firm entry. Rather than quantifying aggregate firm entry and store count within sampled markets, 
the survey only indicates whether a given fast food company operates within a given market. 
Also, there were not sufficient Pizza Hut market entries to allow for its rigorous analysis. 
 Accounting for the particular strengths and weaknesses of the CHNS data, the key 
independent variable is initial market entry for McDonald’s, KFC, and other Chinese firms 
(which differs from the ideal theoretical independent variable: initial and subsequent market 
entries by firm). These independent variables were constructed from the dataset by creating a 
firm entry variable based on whether a firm existed in a given community from one surveyed 
year to another. Although it would have been ideal to use annual entry data instead of biennial, 
Shen and Xiao’s similar research found no difference in annual or biennial results (2013). 
 When utilizing the independent entry variables for these three firm-specific time hazard 
analyses, the estimation samples for each firm’s empirical entry model were selected based on 
observations that were not left-censored and that contained all relevant dependent variables. The 
resulting three estimation samples’ summary statistics can be seen in Figure X (Section IX).  
 The independent variable of initial market entry for each firm (McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza 
Hut, and local Chinese fast food firms) can be observed below by time period in Table 2. These 
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firms’ initial market entry across various market types (high-population and urban), in addition 
to firm entry across time period, can be observed graphically in Figures 2-5 (Section IX). 
VII. Results and Findings 
 
Using a single-spell discrete time hazard analysis to determine factors influencing initial 
market entry decisions for McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut, and other Chinese fast food firms in 
Eastern China during 2004-2011, several interesting conclusions can be drawn, both aligning 
with and departing from previous empirical and theoretical research on firm market entry. All 
three time-hazard analyses described in this section can be observed in Table 5 (Section IX).  
Before interpreting the significant results of each analysis, it is worth noting that the 
variance of the time-invariant community error is only significantly different from zero for the 
Chinese local fast food firms. Thus neither KFC nor McDonald’s are influenced by fixed 
unobservables (to the econometrician) of communities, but Chinese firms are influenced by these 
unobservables. This observation may result from Chinese firms’ greater attunement to 
(observable and unobservable) local conditions than the globalized corporate fast food firms. 
While it is hypothesized that McDonald’s would be more likely to enter markets where 
KFC already existed (since McDonald’s is the latecomer to China where KFC dominates), this 
could not be proven at a p-value of 0.10, despite previous research’s success doing so (Shen and 
Xiao 2013). There is at least one compelling reason why this may be so: this research’s recent 
dataset (2006-2011) could examine a time period when McDonald’s had matured from 
competitive infancy in China and thus entered markets with more autonomy (and less need to 
imitate KFC) than its earlier years. Another reason is that the analysis cannot control for the 
endogeneity of McDonald’s decision, which may be correlated with unobservable community 
characteristics. The results did indicate with significance that McDonald’s is strongly positively 
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influenced to initially enter a Chinese market if it is urban, and to a much lesser degree is also 
positively influenced by the quantity of fast food restaurants that are already operating in the 
market. 
When analyzing the factors that influence KFC to initially enter a given Chinese market, 
the theoretical model would imply KFC to be more driven by demographic data and experience 
than the other firms (since as a “leader” firm, KFC would seek out and enter markets before 
“follower” firms). This hypothesis proved true, and the factors that most positively influence 
KFC’s market entry are mean market wages and whether the market supports a population over 1 
million. These results can be explained by the fact that unlike McDonald’s, KFC has already 
exhausted growth in urban markets and thus is driven to find up-and-coming high-population 
(but not yet necessarily urbanized or highly developed) markets to enter before its rivals. 
When performing an identical time-hazard analysis for Chinese fast food firms’ initial 
market entry, these resource-starved firms were expected by theory to “follow” or imitate their 
larger Western rivals’ market locations. This hypothesis proved correct, as local Chinese fast 
food firms’ initial market entry decisions were highly positively influenced by the existing 
market presence of a KFC. More so than the KFC factor, these firms were also inclined to enter 
markets with high mean wages. These results can be explained by local Chinese firms’ lack of 
experience in profitable market entry combined with their low budgets, thus incentivizing them 
to “piggyback” off KFC’s market entry success. As for the tendency of Chinese firms to enter 
higher-income markets, perhaps this is because their prices are higher than those of their Western 
rivals. Another explanation: demand for local food could be an emerging upper-class trend. 
While there were insufficient observations of Pizza Hut market entries and existence 
between 2004 and 2011 to perform a discrete time-hazard analysis, it can be observed that 100% 
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of Pizza Hut entries occurred in markets where KFCs existed, as well as in exclusively urban 
markets (Table 3). Theory supports this finding, given that KFC and Pizza Hut are owned by the 
same parent company Yum! Brands, and Pizza Hut entered China later than KFC. It’s quite 
plausible that KFC shares its market profitability research with Pizza Hut to act on its findings. 
Moreover, Pizza Hut may mitigate expansion risk as a “follower” firm by entering only markets 
where customers have developed a taste for Western fast food (AKA urban markets with KFCs). 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
This research examines factors influencing initial market entry in Eastern China for 
Western and local Chinese fast food firms between 2004 and 2011. The results bolster the case 
for firm-learning theory by demonstrating that local Chinese fast food firms are imitating KFC’s 
market existence when entering new markets. The research results also indicate that McDonald’s 
and KFC are driven by distinct factors (urbanization and high-population, respectively) when 
determining markets to enter. This leads to the interesting conclusion that McDonald’s may have 
matured in its China operations to the point where it no longer emulates KFC’s entry decisions. 
 Future research that builds upon these findings could employ a comprehensive dataset 
(spanning KFC’s initial 1987 China entry to the present) and thus observe whether McDonald’s, 
Yum! Brands’, and local Chinese firms’ entry strategies changed over time as market dynamics 
shifted. A more comprehensive dataset would also allow a proper time-hazard analysis of 
whether and to what degree Pizza Hut emulates KFC’s market entry decisions, which would be 
compelling, as both firms operate under Yum! Brands and thus may share information, but still 
must compete against or assist one another to grow profits within the same Chinese markets. 
 Finally, a natural extension of this research would be to examine the same firms’ market 
entry in China across the broader time period mentioned, but also examine repeat market entries 
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as Toivanen and Waterson (2005) did. Doing so would reveal to what degree these firms are 
likely to re-enter markets where they already operate versus entering untapped markets, where 
potentially higher profit potential exists—but so does risk of costly profitability miscalculations. 
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IX. Tables and Figures 
Table 2A      
Description of Market-Structure Variables           
      
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs 
Community ID 370879.300 (106419.700) 111101 552304 946 
Survey Year 2007.766 (2.753) 2004 2011 946 
Year ID 2.613 (1.145) 1 4 938 
Mean Wages (log) 9.348 (0.737) 6.534 11.293 942 
N of Fast Food Restaurants 0.517 (3.544) 0 90 930 
Province 36.934 (10.637) 11 55 938 
Urban (binary) 0.353 (0.478) 0 1 938 
City Population 1 Million+ (binary) 0.451 (0.498) 0 1 923 
City Population Density 2548.763 (8928.925) 8.547 158446.1 911 
City Exist McDonald's (binary) 0.164 (0.371) 0 1 938 
City Exist KFC (binary) 0.224 (0.417) 0 1 938 
City Exist Pizza Hut (binary) 0.092 (0.289) 0 1 938 
City Exist Other Chinese (binary) 0.110 (0.313) 0 1 938 
      
Table 2B      
Description of Market-Entry Variables           
      
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs 
City Entry Any (binary) 0.135 (0.342) 0 1 754 
City Entry KFC (binary) 0.047 (0.212) 0 1 764 
City Entry McDonald's (binary) 0.030 (0.170) 0 1 808 
City Entry Other Chinese (binary) 0.064 (0.244) 0 1 864 
City Entry Pizza Hut (binary) 0.016 (0.126) 0 1 866 
City Entry YUM (binary) 0.087 (0.281) 0 1 797 
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Table 3         
Summary Statistics for Firm Entry by Key Variables             
         
 
McDonald's Entry KFC Entry Pizza Hut Entry Other Chinese Firm Entry 
Key Variables Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Time Period                 
2004 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
2006 0.040 (0.197) 0.073 (0.261) 0.024 (0.153) 0.061 (0.239) 
2009 0.058 (0.234) 0.067 (0.251) 0.015 (0.121) 0.126 (0.333) 
2011 0.022 (0.148) 0.049 (0.217) 0.024 (0.155) 0.067 (0.250) 
Urban vs. Rural                 
Urban 0.062 (0.241) 0.079 (0.271) 0.052 (0.223) 0.068 (0.251) 
Rural 0.017 (0.130) 0.036 (0.185) 0.000 (0.000) 0.062 (0.241) 
High vs. Low-Population                 
> 1 Million 0.042 (0.201) 0.081 (0.273) 0.036 (0.186) 0.066 (0.249) 
≤ 1 Million 0.022 (0.146) 0.026 (0.160) 0.002 (0.045) 0.061 (0.240) 
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Table 4     
Estimation Sample Statistics         
     
Variables S = 0  (N = 8,956) 
McDonald's 
Entry  
(N = 3,745) 
KFC Entry  
(N = 3,549) 
Other Chinese 
Firm Entry  
(N = 4,544) 
Mean Wages (log) 9.348 9.045 9.015 9.057 
 (0.737) (0.678) (0.672) (0.667) 
N of Fast Food Restaurants 0.517 0.366 0.377 0.400 
 (3.544) (2.121) (2.176) (2.168) 
Urban (binary) 0.353 0.265 0.252 0.320 
 (0.478) (0.442) (0.435) (0.467) 
City Population 1 Million+ (binary) 0.451 0.404 0.371 0.428 
 (0.498) (0.491) (0.483) (0.495) 
City Population Density 2548.763 1339.276 1319.951 1423.475 
 (8928.925) (5955.118) (6090.265) (5876.312) 
City Exist McDonald's (binary) 0.164 … 0.020 0.102 
 (0.371) … (0.139) (0.303) 
City Exist KFC (binary) 0.224 0.071 … 0.141 
 (0.417) (0.257) … (0.348) 
City Entry McDonald's (binary) 0.030 0.041 … … 
 (0.170) (0.199) … … 
City Entry KFC (binary) 0.047 … 0.067 … 
 (0.212) … (0.250) … 
City Entry Other Chinese (binary) 0.064 … … 0.093 
  (0.244) … … (0.291) 
     
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the baseline estimation samples for McDonald's, KFC, and other Chinese firms' respective discrete time hazard 
entry analyses. Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 5    
Discrete Time Hazard Analysis of Fast Food Firm Initial City Market Entry     
    
Variables McDonald's Entry KFC Entry 
Other Chinese 
Firm Entry 
City Population Density (lag) 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban (binary) (lag) 1.779* 0.263 -1.074 
 (0.924) (0.643) (1.022) 
City Population 1 Million+ (binary) (lag) -0.972 1.799** -0.018 
 (0.755) (0.757) (0.843) 
Mean Wages (log) (lag) 1.235 1.933*** 3.208*** 
 (0.754) -0.746 (0.928) 
N of Fast Food Restaurants (lag) 0.185** 0.135* 0.158 
 (0.086) (0.078) (0.119) 
City Exist KFC (binary) (lag) 1.246 … 2.776** 
 (0.951) … (1.259) 
City Exist McDonald's (binary) (lag) … 1.474 -0.187 
 … (1.463) (1.360) 
Constant -16.402** -22.740*** -35.512*** 
  (8.209) (7.933) (9.048) 
 
1.219 (1.476) 1.307 (1.113) 3.113 (0.341) 
    
Observations 535 507 568 
Number of Communities 199 193 216 
Notes: *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Table shows results for single-spell discrete time 
hazard analysis of initial market entry for McDonald's, KFC, and Chinese firms as a function of market structure. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The standard error 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  is assumed to have a mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2. 
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Figure 2         
Number of Initial Market Entries by Firm (Time Period)         
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Figure 3         
Number of Initial Market Entries by Firm (Urban vs. Rural)         
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Figure 4         
Number of Initial Market Entries by Firm (High vs. Low-Population)       
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Appendix 
 
Table A1   
Description of Variables   
   
Independent Variables 
Short name Variable name Long definition 
Community ID Community 
identifier 
Identifies the 190 unique communities surveyed 
Survey Year Survey year Identifies year of survey (2004, 2006, 2009, 2011) 
Year ID Survey year 
identifier 
Assigns number ID (1-4) to each of the survey years 
Province Province identifier Identifies city province 
Mean Wages 
(log) 
Log of mean wages Quantifies log of mean wages for a given community (wages measured in RMB) 
Urban (binary) =1 if city is urban Identifies whether a city is classified as urban or rural by the Chinese government 
City Population 1 
Million+ (binary) 
=1 if city population 
is over 1 million 
Identifies whether a city has a population over 1 million 
City Population 
Density 
City population 
density 
Quantifies a city's population density by dividing the city's population by area (sq km) 
N of Fast Food 
Restaurants 
Number of fast food 
restaurants 
Quantifies total number of  fast food restaurants operating in a given city 
City Exist 
McDonald's 
(binary) 
=1 if McDonald's 
exists in city 
Identifies whether at least one McDonald's restaurant exists in a given city 
City Exist KFC 
(binary) 
=1 if KFC exists in 
city 
Identifies whether at least one KFC restaurant exists in a given city 
City Exist Pizza 
Hut (binary) 
=1 if Pizza Hut 
exists in city 
Identifies whether at least one Pizza Hut restaurant exists in a given city 
City Exist Other 
Chinese (binary) 
=1 if Other Chinese 
Firm exists in city 
Identifies whether at least one other Chinese fast food firm exists in a given city 
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Table A1   
Description of Variables (continued) 
Dependent Variables 
Short name Variable name Long definition 
City Entry Any 
(binary) 
=1 if any fast food 
firm initially enters 
into city 
Identifies whether any fast food firm enters a city market for the first time 
City Entry KFC 
(binary) 
=1 if KFC initially 
enters into city 
Identifies whether KFC enters a city market for the first time 
City Entry 
McDonald's 
(binary) 
=1 if McDonald's 
initially enters into 
city 
Identifies whether McDonald's enters a city market for the first time 
City Entry Other 
Chinese (binary) 
=1 if Other Chinese 
Firm initially enters 
into city 
Identifies whether other Chinese fast food firms enter a city market for the first time 
City Entry Pizza 
Hut (binary) 
=1 if Pizza Hut 
initially enters into 
city 
Identifies whether Pizza Hut enters a city market for the first time 
City Entry YUM 
(binary) 
=1 if YUM! Brands 
initially enters into 
city 
Identifies whether YUM! Brands enters a city market for the first time 
   
Notes: All city entry variables are constructed for proper use in a single-spell discrete time hazard analysis. This means that once a firm enters a 
given market (for a value of 1), the values for that firm's city entry variable in each subsequent year are labeled missing. All data from the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (2004-2011). 
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